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Abstract
Equivalence between rejective core and set of dividend equilibria allocations is
studied in finite economy and double infinity economy frameworks in presence of
indivisibilities of commodities while also allowing the presence of satiated agents.
It is further shown that in the finite economy and the double infinity economy, the
core of every renegotiation core, the rejective core of every replica economy and the
set of dividend equilibria are identical. Hence, core equivalence is demonstrated
in both frameworks.
Keywords: Core equivalence, Indivisible commodities, Satiation, Dividend equi-
librium, Rejective core, Renegotiation core.
1 Introduction
We study the core equivalence problem while incorporating indivisibilities and satia-
tion simultaneously into the general equilibrium framework in two different settings,
namely, the classical model with finite economy; and the overlapping generations dou-
ble infinity economy. The seminal work on core equivalence in finite economy is due
to Debreu and Scarf, 1963 wherein they show that as economy is replicated an ar-
bitrarily large number times, the core converges to the set of Walrasian equilibria.
Corresponding work in a large economy is due to Aumann, 1964, who shows the core
equivalence in a large economy. Hildenbrand, 1974 provides another exposition of the
large economy problem using Lyapunov’s convexity theorem
The question of incorporating indivisibilities in a large economy to model the situa-
tions wherein the agents can trade some of the commodities only in integer quantities
is due to Mas-Colell, 1977. Core equivalence in this framework is due to Ali Khan and
Yamazaki, 1981. Both of these studies limit themselves to a case wherein there is only
one divisible commodity in the market. This framework is generalized by Hammond,
Kaneko, and Wooders, 1989, who study the widespread externalities in a large econ-
omy while having the presence of both divisible and indivisible commodities with no
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restriction on number of divisible or indivisible commodities except that there be at
least one divisible commodity. Core equivalence in a large economy in the scenario
where all commodities are indivisible is due to Inoue, 2006. Inoue, 2014 shows a sim-
ilar result under some assumptions for a finite economy. However, all these works do
not dispense with non-satiation of all agents.
Dreze and Muller, 1980 conceptualize the notion of dividend equilibrium, while
Mas-Colell, 1992 defines the concept of equilibrium with a slack. These concepts are
quite similar and deal with satiated agents. A. Konovalov, 1998, Alexander Kono-
valov, 2005 and Miyazaki and Takekuma, 2010 form a body of works that are quite
significant inasmuch as equivalence between rejective core and dividend equilibrium
is concerned. Alexander Konovalov, 2005 and Miyazaki and Takekuma, 2010 deal
with a large economy, while A. Konovalov, 1998 deals with a large economy with fi-
nite number of types. They all show equivalence between rejective core and dividend
equilibrium. Murakami and Urai, 2017 show a relation between core of every renego-
tiation economy and rejective core and prove a limit core theorem between dividend
equilibrium and core of every renegotiation economy in the context of a finite economy.
This class of works does not dispense with the notion of divisibility of commodities.
Samuelson, 1958 was the pioneer in welfare analysis in overlapping generations
economy, and shows that Walrasian equilibrium may not be Pareto optimal. Balasko
and Shell, 1980 define the notion of weak Pareto optimality to characterize the core
and show that competitive equilibrium is weakly Pareto optimal in overlapping gen-
erations economy. Aliprantis and Burkinshaw, 1990 and Chae and Esteban, 1993
study the core equivalence in the framework of overlapping generations. Urai and Mu-
rakami, 2016 study a double infinity economy model which has an infinity of traders
and commodities, thereby encompassing the double infinity characteristic of overlap-
ping generations economy. They show the equivalence between finite core of every
renegotiation economy and set of monetary equilibria in a double infinity economy.
While the standard framework of general equilibrium rests upon assumption of
non-satiation and perfectly divisible commodities, studies on core equivalence have
relaxed either non-satiation or indivisibilities; to the best of our knowledge, no work
in literature relaxes both of these assumptions simultaneously. Our contribution is
to relax these assumptions simultaneously while showing the core equivalence result
in both of these frameworks, viz. finite economy and double infinity economy. Fur-
ther, the varied nature of these frameworks endows our results with a wide range of
applicability.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we consider a finite deterministic
economy with indivisibilities, and after defining the basic notation and concepts, we
proceed to show the relation between the set of dividend equilibria allocations, the
rejective core of the replica economy and the core of every renegotiation economy. We
then show the main result of the section, which is that as the economy is replicated ar-
bitrarily large number of times, the set of dividend equilibria allocations, the rejective
core of the replica economy and the core of every renegotiation economy converge.
In Section 3, we consider a double infinity economy with indivisibilities. We firstly
mention as to how the double infinity economy shows the same characteristics as a
traditional over-lapping generations economy. We then appropriately modify the as-
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sumptions, notations and the basic concepts for the double infinity economy, and pro-
ceed to show the analogous relation between the set of dividend equilibria allocations,
the finite rejective core and the finite core of a renegotiation economy. In doing so, we
use the construction of the rejecting coalition from Section 2. We then go on to prove
the main result of the section, which is that as the economy is replicated arbitrarily
large number of times, the set of dividend equilibria allocations, the rejective core of
the replica economy and the core of every renegotiation economy converge. We also
discuss the role of replications, as well as the role of taking finite cores in bringing
about the core equivalence. We then conclude the paper.
2 Finite Economy
In this section, we consider an economy E with a finite number of agents and finitely
many commodities. Let I denote the set of agents and K denote the set of commodities.
We take K = N ∪ D, where N represents the set of indivisible or non-divisible com-
modities which the agents are constrained to consume only in integer amounts and D
represents the set of divisible commodities. Throughout, we assume that D 6= ∅. Thus,
the commodity space of the economy is represented as X := RD × ZN if N 6= ∅; and
X := RD, otherwise. The consumption set of each agent is assumed to be X+. Further,
we denote by X++ the set of strictly positive elements of X.
We assume the following insofar as preferences and endowments are concerned:
A.1 The preference structure of agents: (%i, ei), %i is complete and continuous on X+
and ei is the initial endowment of agent i. It is assumed that for all i ∈ I, ≻i (xi)
(set of all bundles strictly preferred to xi by agent i) is an open set in the subspace
topology which X+ inherits from X.
A.2 The convexity of preferences is modified in the following manner: ∀ yi, zi ∈≻i
(xi) ⊆ X+, the set Λ(yi, zi) = {λ.yi + (1− λ).zi : λ ∈ [0, 1]} ∩X+ ⊂≻i (xi).
A.3 We allow for the possibility of satiation, i.e. there may exist some i ∈ I and some
xi ∈ X+ such that ≻i (xi) = ∅.
A.4 We also assume that there is at-least one agent b whose preferences satisfy mono-
tonicity. In other words, {xb}+X++ ⊆ ≻b (xb).
A.5 We also assume that there is at-least one agent b′ whose preferences satisfy strict
monotonicity with respect to divisible commodities in the interior of the con-
sumption space of divisible commodities. In other words, if PrRD+ [xb′ ] >> 0, then
{xb′}+X+ ∩ ((R
D
+ \ {0})× Z
N
+ ) ⊆ ≻b′ (xb′).
If N 6= ∅, we impose following additional assumptions:
A.6 For the agent b′, for any x ∈ X+ and and any y ∈ X+, such that PrRD+ [x] >> 0 and
PrRD+ [y] ∈ Bd R
D
+ , x ≻b′ y.
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A.7 There is an agent c whose preferences satisfy overriding desirability of divisible
commodities, in other words, for all xc ∈ X+, ∃ yc ∈ X+, such that PrZN+ [yc] = 0
and yc ≻c xc
1.
A.8 Every agent is endowed with a strictly positive amount of every commodity and
the endowment vector is at least as good as any bundle containing indivisible
bundles only. In other words, ei ∈ X++ for all i ∈ I and ei ≻i (0, a) for all a ∈ Z
N
+ .
The above assumptions are well founded in literature in these works: Ali Khan and
Yamazaki, 1981, Mas-Colell, 1977 and Hammond et al., 1989.
2.1 Core and Equilibrium Concepts
We now proceed to explain the notations and subsequently define the basic concepts
for this section.
Definition 2.1. A coalition in E is a non-empty subset of I and an allocation of E is
just a n-tuple bundle of commodity vectors. Furthermore, an allocation x = (xi)i∈I is




i∈I ei. A coalition S is said to block an allocation x






2. yi ≻i xi for all i ∈ S.
The core of E is defined to be the set of all feasible allocations that cannot be blocked
by any coalition.
The following definition is due to Alexander Konovalov, 2005 in an economy with a
non-atomic measure space of agents. The following definition is just an adaptation of
the one given by Alexander Konovalov, 2005 in a framework with finitely many agents,
refer to Murakami and Urai, 2017.
Definition 2.2. A coalition S is said to reject an allocation x with a feasible allocation
y if there exist S1 and S2 such that the following hold:










3. yi ≻i xi for all i ∈ S; and
4. yi %i ei for all i ∈ I \ S.
The rejective core of the economy E is the set of all such feasible allocations which
cannot be rejected by any coalition. We denote by R the rejective core of the economy E .
1Agents b and c may be same or different.
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Note that when S1 is empty then we can neglect the condition 4 by choosing yi = ei
for all i /∈ S. Thus, the above definition of rejection by a coalition is stronger than that
of blocking by a coalition, which implies the rejective core is a subset of the core.
Definition 2.3. A dividend equilibrium allocation is a feasible allocation x =
(xi)i∈I satisfying the following: there exist
1. an element d ∈ RI+ such that d = (di)i∈I , where di ∈ R+; and
2. an element p ∈ RK+ ,
such that xi is the maximal element (in accordance with %i ) of the dividend budget set
of agent i ∈ I, where the dividend budget set is given by:
B(p, ei, di) = {zi : p.zi ≤ p.ei + di}.
The set of all dividend equilibrium allocations of E is denoted by D .
Definition 2.4. A dividend equilibrium is the tuple (x, p, d) where (x, p, d) satisfy
the requirements of Definition 2.3
2.2 Re-negotiation and the equivalence theorem
In above subsection, we mainly focus on the the economy E . We now introduce the
concept of re-negotiation in a replica economy and discuss its relation with the notions
of rejective core and the set of dividend equilibrium of the original economy.
Let x be any feasible allocation. Then an economy in which initial endowment
allocation is x, keeping the preferences and the set of agents unchanged is denoted by
E(x). Thus, we have E = E(ω). An economy in which each agent is replicated n times
in the economy E(x), that is, the n-replica of the economy E(x), is denoted by En(x).
We define the renegotiation replica economy in line with Murakami and Urai, 2017.
For integers m ≥ 1 and n ≥ 0, the (m + n)-fold re-negotiation replica economy,
denoted by Em(e)
⊕
En(x), is defined in the sense that each agent i is replicated m+ n
times, with m replicas of agent i having the endowment ei and n replicas of agent i
having the endowment xi. For an allocation y of the economy E(x), we denote by y
n an
allocation of the economy En(x) in which each replica of agent i consumes the bundle yi.
Analogously, given a common allocation y in economies E(e) and E(x), ym+n represents
(m + n)-fold replica allocation of y in the (m + n)-fold re-negotiation replica economy.
Finally, we denote by C (m,n) the core of the (m+n)-fold re-negotiation replica economy,
and by Rn the rejective core of the replicated economy En(e).
We now restate the Proposition 1 of Murakami and Urai, 2017 as follows and note
that this lemma will hold irrespective of divisibility of commodities.
Proposition 1. For all integers m ≥ 1 and n ≥ 0, let xm+n be a rejective core al-
location for replica economy Em+n(e). Then, xm+n is a core allocation of the economy
Em(e)
⊕
En(x). In other words, Rm+n ⊆ C (m,n).
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Proposition 2. For each n ≥ 1, nth-replica of any dividend equilibrium allocation of
E belongs to the rejective core of the economy En(e).
Proof. Let (x, p, d) be a dividend equilibrium of E . By definition, it is feasible. If x is not
a part of the rejective core of En(e), then there exists a finite coalition S of the economy
En(e), which rejects xn with allocation y of En(e). Then, following must go through:2











3. y(i,h) ≻i x(i,h) for all (i, h) ∈ S; and
4. y(i,h) %i e(i,h) for all (i, h) /∈ S.












Since xi is affordable for every agent i under the given equilibrium, then p.x(i,h) ≤











Coupling this with condition 2, taking an inner product with the vector p and using











This is a contradiction, which completes the proof.
Proposition 3. Any allocation x of E whose (m + n)th-replica belongs to the core of
the (m + n)-re-negotiation economy for all m ≥ 1 and n ≥ 0 is a dividend equilibrium
allocation of E .
Proof. Let x be an allocation of E whose (m + n)th-replica belongs to the core of the
(m+n)-re-negotiation economy for all m ≥ 1 and n ≥ 0. We denote the set of agents in
I who are satiated (resp. non-satiated) under allocation x by IS (resp. INS). For any
agent i ∈ INS, we define the sets3
Γ1i = Co(≻i (xi)− xi) = Co
({
z1i ∈ R
D × ZN : z1i + xi ≻i xi
})
Γ2i = Co(≻i (xi)− ei) = Co
({
z2i ∈ R
D × ZN : z2i + ei ≻i xi
})
2In what follows, the symbol (i, h) will mean hth-replica of consumer i.
3For any non-empty set A ⊆ RD×ZN , the notation Co(A) stands for the convex hull of A in RD×RN ≡
RK .
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Since Γ1i and Γ
2




















z = βi.z1i + (1− β
i).z2i











Lastly, we denote by Γ the convex hull of the finite union of all such Γi for non-satiated









αi.(βi.z1i + (1− β
i).z2i )






i and 0 ≤ α




Claim 3.1. Γ ∩ RK−− = ∅.
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It follows from Claim 3.1 and the separating hyper-plane theorem, there is a vector











particular, for all agents i ∈ INS and yi ≻i xi, we have p.yi ≥ p.xi and p.yi ≥ p.ei.
Presence of agent b in the economy ensures that prices are non-negative. This is
seen as follows: suppose price of a commodity is negative, and let that commodity be
k. Consider the bundle zM = xb + (1, · · · ,M, · · · , 1), with an integer M on component
corresponding to k. There will exist a large enough integer M such that zM ≻b xb and
p.zM < p.xb, which is a contradiction.
Further, presence of agent c ensures that at-least one divisible good has a positive
price. This can be seen as follows. First, note that the strict positivity of ec implies
p.ec > 0. Let e
D be a vector with value 1 on components corresponding to the divisible
goods and 0 on every other component. By overriding desirability of divisible commodi-
ties for agent c, there exists some λc > 0 such that λc.e
D ≻c xc. But p.λc.e
D = 0 < p.ec.
This is a contradiction with the separating hyper-plane argument following Claim 3.1.
Furthermore, presence of agent b′ ensures that prices of all divisible commodities
are positive. This is seen as follows:
Case 1: Let N = ∅. Since p.xb′ ≥ p.eb′ > 0, there is some commodity l ∈ D such that
pl > 0 and xlb′ > 0.
Case 2: Let N 6= ∅. Then by assumption A.6 and the fact that xb′  eb′ , we have
xmb′ > 0 for all m ∈ D.
Thus, irrespective of the fact that whether there is a non-divisible commodity, there is
always a divisible commodity l with positive price and xlb′ > 0. Let k ∈ D be a divisible
commodity with 0 price. Then, by continuity of preferences, there is some λ > 0 such
that xb′ + e
k − λ.el ≻b′ xb′ . However, p.(xb′ + e
k − λ.el) < p.xb′ . This is a contradiction
with the separating hyper-plane argument following Claim 3.1.
Now, define di = max{0, p.xi − p.ei} and d = (di)i∈I . Then, by construction, xi ∈
Bi(p, ei, di). We now show the individual rationality under the price and dividend sys-
tem (p, d). For each i ∈ I, affordability of xi follows from construction. It only remains
4Proof of this claim is given in Appendix.
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to show that xi maximizes the preference of agent i in the budget set for any non-
satiated agent.
Suppose that yi ≻i xi for some i ∈ I
NS and p.yi = p.ei.
5 Define zλi by setting
PrRN [z
λ
i ] = PrRN [yi] and PrRD [z
λ
i ] = λPrRD [yi]. Continuity of preferences guarantees
the existence of some λ ∈ (0, 1) close enough to 1 such that zλi ≻i xi. Since p.yi > 0,
0 < p.zλi < p.yi. Strict inequality follows from the fact that price of every divisible
commodity is positive. This implies that p.zi < p.ei = p.yi, which is a contradiction
to the result obtained in Claim 3.1. Similarly, suppose that yi ≻i xi for some i ∈ Is
and p.yi = p.xi. Proceeding similarly, a contradiction is again obtained. These two
contradictions together imply that p.yi > max{p.ei, p.xi} or p.yi > p.ei + di.
Theorem 2.1. For any feasible allocation x of the economy E , following statements are
equivalent:
1. xm+n ∈ Rm+n for all m ≥ 1 and n ≥ 0.
2. xm+n ∈ C (m,n) for all m ≥ 1 and n ≥ 0.
3. x ∈ D
Proof. Follows directly from Propositions 1, 2, and 3.
3 Double Infinity Economy
The model for double infinity economies is based upon Urai and Murakami, 2016, in
which there are infinitely many traders and commodities. This model uses overlapping
commodities, and considers that set of agents in each time period to be disjoint from
the set of agents living in some other time period. This model preserves the double
infinity characteristics of a traditional overlapping generations economy in the sense
that while there are a infinite number of traders, they do not interact all at once in
the same market.
Under the assumption on strict temporal separability of preferences, this model
can be considered to be a traditional overlapping generations model. However, this
assumption is too strong, and hence, it is appropriate to refer to this model as a double
infinity model rather than an overlapping generations model. We follow this terminol-
ogy throughout the paper.
The main result of this section is to establish the core equivalence in a double in-
finity economy framework, thereby extending the result of Theorem 2.1. This model
considers a sequence of markets which are linked by commodities, rather than agents,
and hence is a significant departure from the traditional finite economy model. How-
ever, as this section shows, the core equivalence in this framework is an extension of
the core equivalence in a traditional finite economy framework. This extension draws
upon the construction used in Section 2 for creation of a rejecting coalition. This in
5A.8, combined with individual rationality of agent i implies that xi %i ei. This, in turn implies that
if yi ≻i xi, then PrRD [yi] ≥ 0 and PrRD [yi] 6= 0.
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turn, leads to quite analogous results as in Section 2. Thus, we show that insofar as
core equivalence is concerned, even a radically different market structure obeys the
same result as a traditional finite economy model.
The pure exchange economy, denoted by E , comprises of the following:
1. Agents
A.1.1 The set of agents present in the market during time period t is finite and is
represented by It.
A.1.2 The set of all the agents in the economy is represented by {It}t≥1. Each agent
lives for only one period. This in turn implies that {It}t≥1 is a collection of
pairwise disjoint sets.
A.1.3 We also assume that if It = ∅, then Is = ∅ for all s > t.
2. Commodities
A.2.1 The set of commodities available in time period t is a finite set and is denoted
by Kt.
A.2.2 Each Kt can be expressed as Kt = Nt ∪ Dt, where Nt represents the set of
indivisible or non-divisible commodities which the agents are constrained
to consume only in integer amounts and Dt represents the set of divisible
commodities. Throughout, we assume that Dt 6= ∅ for all t.





if Nt 6= ∅, and Xt+ := R
Dt
+ , otherwise.
A.2.4 The commodities overlap in the sense that if Kt = {k(t), k(t) + 1, · · · , k(t) +
l(t)}, then k(t) < k(t + 1) ≤ k(t) + l(t). For any time period t, the set of






A.2.5 Every agent i ∈ It has a positive initial endowment of every commodity that
is available in generation t, that is, ei >> 0.
3. Preferences
A.3.1 The preferences of the agents are complete and continuous. Continuity of
preferences implies that for all i ∈ It, ≻i (xi) (set of all bundles strictly
preferred to xi by agent i) is an open set in the subspace topology which
Xt+ inherits from R
Dt × RNt if Nt 6= ∅, and R
Dt , otherwise.
A.3.2 The convexity of preferences is modified in the following manner: for all t, for
all i ∈ It, if yi, zi ∈≻i (xi) ⊆ Xt+, then the set Λ(yi, zi) := {λ.yi + (1− λ).zi|λ ∈
[0, 1]} ∩Xt+ ⊂≻i (xi).
A.3.3 We allow for the possibility of satiation, i.e. for any t, there may exist some
i ∈ It and some xi ∈ Xt+ such that ≻i (xi) = ∅.
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A.3.4 There exists at-least one agent b ∈ It for every time period t having strictly
monotone preferences with respect to divisible commodities in the interior of





0, then {xb}+ (Xt+ \ {0}) ⊆ ≻b (xb).
If for any t, Nt 6= ∅, we impose following additional assumptions:
A.3.5 Preferences of agent b having strict monotonicity satisfy overriding desir-
ability of divisible commodities, in other words, for all xb ∈ Xt+, there exists
yb ∈ Xt+, such that PrZNt+
[yb] = 0 and yb ≻b xb.
67









[y] ∈ Bd RDt+ , x ≻b y.
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A.3.7 For every agent i, ei ≻i (0, x) for all x ∈ Z
Nt
+ .







Kt, {Xt+, %i, ei}i∈ ⋃
t≥1
It〉
The replication structure is taken to be same as in previous structure, as is the
definition of renegotiation replica economy. We follow the same replication structure
and notation as in Section 2 to maintain homogeneity.












9 under the restriction that only those components of xi’s
which correspond to the commodities available in the time period when the agent lives
are allowed to take non zero values. An allocation x is defined as x = (xi)i∈ ⋃
t≥1
It .
Note: If X and Y are two homeomorphic topological spaces, then we write X ≈ Y





















+ ) ≈ R
∞
+
Here, R∞+ is the space of all non-negative real-valued sequences. Thus, each of the
xi’s can themselves be written as elements of R
∞
+ . This abuse of notation allows us to
6A.3.5, A.3.6 and A.3.7 deal with overriding desirability of commodities. A.3.5 and A.3.6 are imposed
only on the monotone agent. Coupled with A.3.4, they are tantamount to saying that preferences of the
monotone agent b are neoclassical insofar as divisible commodities are concerned and strictly monotone
as far as indivisible commodities go.
7In this section, we have combined agents b, b′ and c of Section 2 into one agent b. This “combining”
makes no material difference in the proof and has been done solely for ease of notation.
8This is the only additional assumption on preferences made vis-a-vis Section 2.
9If any of the Nt \N(t− 1) = ∅, we just drop Z
Nt\N(t−1)
+ and proceed.
















3.1 Core and Equilibrium Concepts

















2. yi ≻i xi for all i ∈ S.
The core of E is defined to be the set of all feasible allocations of E that cannot be blocked
by any coalition.
Definition 3.2. A coalition S is said to reject an allocation x with a feasible allocation
y if ∃ S1 ⊆ S and ∃ S2 ⊆ S such that the following hold:

















3. yi ≻i xi for all i ∈ S; and




Definition 3.3. The finite rejective core of E is the set of all such feasible allocations
of E which cannot be rejected by any finite coalition of E . We denote by F the finite
rejective core of the economy E . We denote by F n the finite rejective core of the replicated
economy En(e).
Definition 3.4. The finite core of the re-negotiation economy Em(e)
⊕
En(x) is the
set of all feasible allocations of Em(e)
⊕
En(x) which cannot be blocked by any finite
coalition of the same economy. It is denoted by L (m,n).
Definition 3.5. A dividend equilibrium allocation is a feasible allocation x =
(xi)i∈ ⋃
t≥1
It if there exists
1. an element d ∈ R∞+ such that d = (di)i∈
⋃
t≥1
It , where di ∈ R+; and





such that xi is a maximal element of the dividend budget set of agent i ∈ It:





The set of all dividend equilibria allocations is denoted by D11
Definition 3.6. A dividend equilibrium is the tuple (x, p, d) where (x, p, d) satisfy
the requirements of the Definition 3.5
Note: Urai and Murakami, 2016 consider a monetary equilibrium which involves the
transfer of money through generations. Since we consider the transfer of dividends
through the generations, our definition of dividend equilibrium is quite analogous to
theirs. Therefore, we stick with the terminology of dividend equilibrium rather than
monetary equilibrium to emphasize this fact.
Note: It is worth noting that definition of equilibrium concept in the double infinity
economy is a straightforward adaptation of the concept of equilibrium in the finite
economy. However, things do not remain as straightforward insofar as definition of
renegotiation core or rejective core is concerned. In these definitions, we emphasise
that blocking (rejection) be done by a finite coalition. These definitions are adaptations
of definition of renegotiation core used by Urai and Murakami, 2016.
3.2 Renegotiation and the Equivalence Theorem
The renegotiation economy has been defined analogously as in Section 2. We now
restate the Proposition 1 as follows and note that this proposition will hold irrespective
of divisibility of commodities.
Proposition 4. Let xm+n denote a finite rejective core allocation for replica economy
Em+n(e) for some m ≥ 1 and n ≥ 0. Then, xm+n is a finite renegotiation core allocation
for the economy Em(e)
⊕
En(x). In other words, Fm+n ⊆ L (m,n).
Proof. Suppose not and let S be a finite coalition in Em(e)
⊕
En(x) for some m, n which
blocks xm+n with some y. Now, S = S1 ∪ S2, where S1 ⊆
⋃
t≥1




Imt denotes the n replicas of agents in It with an endowment ei and I
n
t denotes the n
replicas of agents in It who have an endowment xi.
Now, consider the following allocation z such that
1. ∀ i ∈ S1 ∪ S2, zi = yi
2. ∀ i ∈ Imt \ S1, zi = ei
3. ∀ i ∈ Int \ S2, zi = xi
The coalition S then rejects allocation xm+n with allocation z, which is a contradic-
tion.
11Henceforth, we shall write PrRKt [p].zi = p.zi.
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Proposition 5. For each n ≥ 1, nth-replica of any dividend equilibrium allocation of
E belongs to the rejective core of the economy En(e).
Proof. The proof mimics the proof of Proposition 2 and has been omitted to avoid rep-
etition.
Note: The use of finite cores in this framework arises from the fact that if infinite
coalitions are allowed, then,
∑
i∈S
p.xi may become infinite, which will not result in the
desired contraction showing that D ⊆ F .
Proposition 6. Any allocation x of E whose (m + n)th-replica belongs to the core of
the (m + n)-re-negotiation economy for all m ≥ 1 and n ≥ 0 is a dividend equilibrium
allocation of E .
Proof. Let x be a feasible allocation of E such that for any m ≥ 1 and n ≥ 0, xm+n ∈
L (m,n) and let t be any given time period. For any time period t, we denote the
satiated agents by ISt , I
S
t ⊆ It.
Now, for any agents i ∈ Is \ I
S
s , 1 ≤ s ≤ t, we define the sets
12:
Γ1i (s) := Co(≻i (xi)− xi) = Co({z
1
i ∈ R
Ds × ZNs |z1i + xi ≻i xi})
Γ2i (s) := Co(≻i (xi)− ei) = Co({z
2
i ∈ R
Ds × ZNs |z2i + ei ≻i xi})
We define the convex hull of Γ1i (s) ∪ Γ
2
i (s), Γi(s) := Co(Γ
1














z = βi.z1i + (1− β
i).z2i











12We allow the following abuse of notation:
1. While defining the vectors z1i and z
2
i , we implicitly consider that for an agent i ∈ Is, xi ∈ Xt+




(RDs\D(s−1) × RNs\N(s−1)) by Yt. While constructing the convex hulls




i and xi in such a way that if i ∈ Is, 1 ≤ s ≤ t,
then:
◮ z1i ∈ Yt ≈ R
K(t)
◮ z2i ∈ Yt ≈ R
K(t)












+ ) ⊆ Yt ≈ R
K(t)
by setting all components of z1i , z
2
i and xi corresponding to K(t) \Ks to be identically 0. In other
words, PrRK(t)\Ks [z
1
i ] ≡ 0, PrRK(t)\Ks [z
2
i ] ≡ 0 and PrRK(t)\Ks [xi] ≡ 0.
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αi.(βi.z1i + (1− β
i).z2i )




























Claim 6.1. Γ(t) ∩ R
K(t)




−− = ∅ ∀ t ; therefore, for any time period t there is a vector p(t) 6= 0,
p(t) ∈ R
K(t)
+ such that if i ∈ Is \ I
S
s for any s = 1, · · · , t, then p(t).z
1










14. In particular, for any s = 1, · · · , t, for all agents i ∈ Is \ I
S
s
and ∀ yi ≻i xi, we have p(t).yi ≥ p(t).xi and p(t).yi ≥ p(t).ei.
We note that R
K(t)








+ under the identity func-






+ . Let Ω(t) be the set of all such
p(t). It is trivially seen that Ω(t) is closed and Ω(t+ 1) ⊆ Ω(t)× R
Kt+1\K(t)
+ .
Claim 6.2. Let p(t) ∈ Ω(t) for any time period t. Then PrRDt [p(t)] >> 0.
Proof. Case 1: Let Nt = ∅. Since p(t).xb ≥ p(t).eb > 0, there is some commodity l ∈ Dt
such that p(t)l > 0 and xlb > 0.
Case 2: Let Nt 6= ∅. Then by assumption A.3.5 and the fact that ei >> 0 ∀ i ∈ It,
there is a divisible good l ∈ D1 such that p(t)
l > 015. Moreover, by assumption A.3.6
and the fact that xb %b eb, we have x
k
b > 0 for all k ∈ Dt.
Thus, in either case, there is always a commodity l ∈ Dt such that p(t)
l > 0 and
xlb > 0. Suppose price of a divisible commodity k ∈ Dt is 0. Then, by continuity of
preferences, there is some λl ∈ (0, xlb) such that xb + e
k − λl.el ≻b xb and p(t).xb >
p(t).(xb + e
k − λl.el). This is a contradiction to the separating hyperplane argument
following Claim 6.1.







i will have value of 0 on components corresponding to all those commodities which do not
exist during time period s. Since QK(t) is dense in RK(t), imposition of this restriction makes no major
difference.
Consider the renegotiation economy ERt.Lt(e)
⊕
ERt.Lt+1(x),where Rt and Lt are constructed anal-
ogous to Section 2. The distribution of consumption bundles across replicas will also be analogously
defined. Further, for all s > t, for any agent i ∈ Is, Rt.Lt + 1 replicas of i consume xi and Rt.Lt replicas
consume ei. This construction satisfies all the conditions required to prove the claim. Thus, all the
arguments of Claim 3.1 go through. We omit the proof to avoid repetition.
14The inner product is taken in the sense of footnote for Definition 3.5.
15If not, then by A.3.5, ∃ yb ≻b xb such that p(t).yb = 0. However, p.ei > 0 for every agent i ∈ It.
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We define the following sets:
Φ(1) := Ω(1) ∩ {x ∈ RK(1)|‖x‖ = 1}
Φ(t) := {p(t) ∈ Ω(t)| Pr
RK(1)
[p(t)] ∈ Φ(1)}
It is trivially seen that Φ(t) is closed for each t.




RK(s)\K(s−1) is compact. Further, ∀ t, ∃ δ(t) > 0 such that
Φ(t) ⊆ Φ(t− 1)× [0, δ(t)]K(t)\K(t−1).
Proof. Since Φ(t) is closed, it suffices to prove that Φ(t) is bounded.
Now, to show that Φ(t) is bounded, we argue as follows. We first show that in time
period 2, prices of all commodities are bounded above. Then we repeat this process of
constructing the upper bounds on prices in all time periods till t by analogous argu-
ments.
For time period 2 and consider a commodity k in the same period. There are three
possibilities.
1. k ∈ D2 and agent b (the agent with strictly monotone preferences) consumes k,
that is, xkb > 0.
2. k ∈ N2 and agent b (the agent with strictly monotone preferences) consumes k,
that is, xkb > 0.
16
3. k ∈ K2 and agent b (the agent with strictly monotone preferences) does not con-




Case 1: This case deals with imposition of an upper bound on prices of divisible
commodities. By the individual rationality of the agent b and A.3.6, we haveD2∩Ψ(2) =
∅. Let k ∈ D2 \K1. Let s ∈ K1 ∩K2. Consider the unit vectors e
s ∈ RK2 and ek ∈ RK2
which have the value 1 on components corresponding to sth and kth commodities and 0
on every other component. Then, ∃ λkb ∈ (0, x
k
b ) such that xb + e
s − λkb .e
k ≻b xb. Since
p(2)s < 1, therefore λkb .p(2)
k < 1, or p(2)k < 1
λk
b
= δk1(2). Define δ1(2) := max
k∈D2\K1
δk1(2). It
is then seen by construction that p(2)k < δ1(2) for every commodity k ∈ D2 \K1.
Case 2: This case deals with imposition of an upper bound on prices of indivisible
commodities which are consumed by the agent b in time-period 2. Let eD2 represent
the vector with value 1 on components corresponding to all divisible commodities in
period 2. A.3.5 and A.3.6 together imply that ∃ µ > 0 such that xb + µ.e
D2 − ek ≻b xb.
Then, p(2).(xb + µ.e






16If N2 = ∅, we skip this case.
17If Ψ(2) = ∅, we skip this case.
18For any finite set S, denote by #S its cardinality.
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p(2)k < µ (#[K1 ∩D2] + δ1(2).#[D2 \K1]) = δ
k
2(2)
Analogous to Case 1, we define δ2(2) := max
k∈(N2\K1)\Ψ(2)
δk2(2). By construction, it is seen
that p(2)k < δ2(2) for every commodity k ∈ (N2 \K1) \Ψ(2).
Case 3: This case deals with imposition of an upper bound on prices of all indivisible
commodities which are not consumed by the agent b in time-period 2. It is seen from










Define µs := |xsb−e
s
b| for all commodities s ∈ K2 \Ψ(2).We note that µ
s’s are bounded








As in previous cases, we analogously define δ3(2) := max
k∈Ψ(2)
δk3(2). We now define
δ(2) := max{δ1(2), δ2(2), δ3(2)}. Thus, it is clear that for any q(2) ∈ Ω(2), if PrRK(1) [q(2)] ∈
Φ(1), then PrRK2\K(1) [q(2)] ∈ [0, δ(2)]
K2\K(1). This, in turn implies that
Φ(2) ⊆ Φ(1)× [0, δ(2)]K2\K(1) ⊆ [0, 1]K1 × [0, δ(2)]K2\K(1).
Thus, Φ(2) is non-empty, bounded and closed, and hence, non-empty compact subset
of RK1 × RK2\K(1).
We repeat this process for every time period s ≤ t to obtain δ(s)19. By construction,
PrRKs\K(s−1) [Φ(s)] ⊆ [0, δ(s)]
Ks\K(s−1). This argument, coupled with the fact that Ω(t) ⊆
Ω(t− 1)× R
Kt\K(t−1)
+ completes the proof of the second part of the Claim.








RKs\K(s−1), where RK1 ×
∏
s>1
RKs\K(s−1) is endowed with product
topology and is a Hausdorff space. By Claim 6.3 and Tychonoff Theorem, Pt is compact





Now, let p ∈
⋂
t≥1
Pt. Define di = max{0, p.xi − p.ei} and d = (di)i∈ ⋃
t≥1
It . Then, by
construction, xi ∈ Bi(p, ei, di). We now show the individual rationality under the price
system p. Affordability of xi follows from construction and hence, individual rationality
follows trivially for the satiated agents.
It only remains to show that xi maximizes the preference of agent i in the budget
set for any non-satiated agent. Let i ∈ Is \ I
S
s . Suppose that yi ≻i xi for some i ∈ Is \ I
S
s
19If for any time period s, if either of Ns or Ψ(s) are empty, we skip the corresponding arguments in
Cases 2 and 3.
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and p.yi = p.ei.
20 Define zi by setting PrRNs [zi] = PrRNs [yi] and PrRDs [zi] ≤ PrRDs [yi]
and PrRDs [zi] 6= PrRDs [yi] so that zi ≻i xi. Continuity of preferences guarantees the
existence of such zi. This implies that p.zi < p.yi = p.ei
21, which is a contradiction to
the result obtained in Claim 6.1. Similarly, suppose that yi ≻i xi for some i ∈ Is \ I
S
s
and p.yi = p.xi. Proceeding similarly, a contradiction is again obtained. These two
contradictions together imply that p.y > max{p.ei, p.xi} or p.y > p.ei + di.
Theorem 3.1. For any feasible allocation x of the economy E , following statements are
equivalent:
1. xm+n ∈ Fm+n for all m ≥ 1 and n ≥ 0.
2. xm+n ∈ L (m,n) for all m ≥ 1 and n ≥ 0.
3. x ∈ D
Proof. Follows directly from Propositions 4, 5, and 6.
4 Concluding Remarks
Theorems 2.1 and 3.1 demonstrate the equivalence between rejective core of replica
economy, cores of all renegotiation economies and the dividend equilibria allocations
for a finite and double infinity economy respectively. We note that Section 3 directly
implies the equivalence for finite number of time periods as well.
Our assumptions regarding the preferences of non-satiated agents are relatively
quite weak. Our assumptions on presence of a few agents with preferences satisfying
monotonicity is a departure from other literature on indivisible commodities, which
impose such assumptions on all agents. Insofar as overriding desirability is concerned,
we impose a weak version on all agents, while reserving the stronger version only for
few agents. This approach makes our result quite general compared to other litera-
ture.
Further, the nature of assumptions in our model allows for presence of agents who
may treat certain commodities as bads. In addition to markets with satiated agents
and having indivisible commodities, this generalization also expands the class of mar-
kets that our paper models.
Section 2 of our paper is significant extension of Murakami and Urai, 2017 in that
we have incorporated indivisibilities in a finite economy. This necessitated a com-
pletely different approach for formulating the proofs in this section.
Section 3 of our paper is bidirectional extension of Urai and Murakami, 2016 in
the sense that we have incorporated satiation and indivisibilities in their model. Our
approach to the problem at hand is quite different from Urai and Murakami, 2016. In
20A.3.7, coupled with individual rationality of agent i implies that if yi ≻i xi then PrRDs [yi] ≥ 0 and
PrRDs [yi] 6= 0.
21The first inequality follows from the fact that prices of all divisible commodities are strictly positive
in all time periods.
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order to account for indivisibilities and satiation, the proofs that we have given in this
section are quite novel and differ significantly from Urai and Murakami, 2016.
Future work in this area may deal with dispensing with the strictly monotone agent
(b′ in Section 2 and b in Section 3). It will be an interesting result to see if the core
equivalence still holds in the absence of this agent.
5 Appendix
In this section, we provide a proof of Claim 3.1, which is the heart of the proof of
Proposition 3. Before that, we give an information discussion on issues of this proof.
Firstly we discuss the broad idea behind the proof. The proof rests upon contradic-
tion, wherein we aim to construct a coalition which will block the allocation x if the
Claim 3.1 happens to be false. Debreu and Scarf, 1963, Murakami and Urai, 2017 and
Urai and Murakami, 2016 show that 0 /∈ Γ (in the context of analogous definitions of
Γ). However, the presence of indivisibilities in our framework prevent us from directly
using the logic of Debreu and Scarf, 1963. This can be illustrated as follows. Sup-
pose there is one divisible and one indivisible commodity and three agents. Further
suppose that β1 = β2 = β3 = 1. Then :
◮ (β1.z11 + (1− β
1).z21) = z
1
1 = (−6, 2) ∈ Γ1
◮ (β2.z12 + (1− β
2).z22) = z
1
2 = (−6, 2) ∈ Γ2
◮ (β3.z13 + (1− β
3).z23) = z
1
3 = (3,−1) ∈ Γ3
Consider the following α’s:




◮ α2 = 1
2π
◮ α3 = 2
3
It is verified that
∑
i∈INS
αi.(βi.z1i + (1 − β
i).z2i ) = 0. However if we aim to replicate
our economy on the basis of denominators of α’s, we can never reach a finite num-
ber of replications which provides the agents with integer quantity of consumption in
indivisible commodity. Similar example can be constructed if z1i or z
2
i were to have
irrational coordinates.
To get over this issue, we use the fact that ∀ L ∈ N, QL is a dense subset of RL.
However, this leads to a different issue, which is defining the appropriate renegotiation
economy. In other words, the issue is to identify m and n in the economy En(e)
⊕
Em(x).
This discussion in mind, we divide our proof in 2 broad steps.
1. In Step 1, we identify the number of replications required so that each replica
can have a consumption which ensures the integer amounts of consumption of in-
divisible commodities. We then identify the appropriate renegotiation economy.
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2. In Step 2, we identify the distribution of consumption bundles across replicas of
each non-satiated agent. Our construction is such that different replicas of an
agent may have different consumption bundles. For a given agent i ∈ INS, we
construct a group of replicas, wherein members of the group (replicas of agent i)
have different consumption bundles. We use this replication structure to identify
the blocking coalition. We then follow up with a check for the feasibility, thereby
establishing the desired contradiction.
Proof of Claim 3.1: Suppose Claim 3.1 does not hold. It follows that, for each i ∈ INS,
there must exist αi, βi ∈ [0, 1] with
∑
i∈INS
αi = 1, z1i ∈ Γ
1
i ∩Q






αi.(βi.z1i + (1− β
i).z2i ) = −z




















where zji1 ∈ ≻i (xi) − xi and z
j
i2 ∈ ≻i (xi) − ei; and δ
ij
1 ’s and δ
ij









δij2 = 1 for all i ∈ I
NS. Rest of the proof is basically
a construction of an appropriate re-negotiation economy in which x can be blocked by
some coalition of this economy. We plan to divide it into three steps.














where, for αi and βi, the numerators are non-negative and denominators are natural
numbers, while for δij1 and δ
ij
2 , both numerator and denominator are natural numbers.
We define the sets X1 and X2 as follows:
X1 =
{




i ∈ INS : βi 6= 1
}
.
Therefore, the set Z, defined by Z := {i ∈ INS : αi > 0}, is non-empty and Z ⊆ X1 ∪ X2.
Let I1 := Z ∩ X1 and I2 := Z ∩ X2. In what follows, we introduce some notations
in order to define an appropriate replicated economy at the same time maintaining
integer amount consumption corresponding to any indivisible commodity.
22Without loss of generality, we can choose same number of elements in the convex combinations for
z1i and z
2
i for all i ∈ I
NS .
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Table 1: Integers defined for proof















































We consider the renegotiation economy ERL+1(x)
⊕
ERL(e). For any agent i, we in-
dex the replica of agent as (i, h), where h = 1, · · · , 2RL+1. For any replica of the agent
i taken from ERL+1(x), the index h runs from 1 to RL + 1, and for any replica of the
agent i taken from ERL(e), the index h runs from RL+ 2 to 2RL+ 1.













































First, consider the replicas in ERL+1(x).








bδ1im replicas of i have the consumption
bundle y(i,h) = xi + z
j
i1, while their endowment is xi. We call the coalition of all
such replicas for each i ∈ I1 by S
1
1 (Table 2). Using our notation for replicas of
agents, we say that for any agent i ∈ I1, the replicas (i, 2), · · · , (i,M
1
i .L+ 1) ∈ S
1
1 .
2. Consider one set of replicas of all agents in INS from ERL+1(x) and denote it by
S21 := {(i, 1) : i ∈ I
NS}. We now assign each agent (i, 1) the consumption bundle

















Due to the local non-satation at xi for all i ∈ I
NS and the monotonicity of agent
b, such a collection of wi’s indeed exists.









replicas of i have the consumption bundle y(i,h) = ei + z
j
i2, while their endowment is ei.
Let S2 be a coalition containing all these replicas for each i ∈ I2 (Table 3). Using our
notation for replicas of agents, we say that for any agent i ∈ I2, the replicas (i, R.L +
2), · · · , (i, R.L+ 1 +M2i .L) ∈ S2.
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Table 2: Consumption distribution of agent i ∈ I1
Value of j Replicas Required Consumption Bundle






bδ1im xi + z
1
i1






























bδ1im xi + z
J
i1
Table 3: Consumption distribution of agent i ∈ I2
Value of j Replicas Required Consumption Bundle






bδ2im ei + z
1
i2






























bδ2im ei + z
J
i2
We are now ready to define the coalition S as S = S11 ∪ S
2
1 ∪ S2.
Step 3. Effectiveness of a blocking coalition: Let i ∈ I1. Then, the aggregate of com-






















































Summing up across all the replicas present in S11 and S2 and simplifying the notation
by substituting the terms involving zji1’s and z
j




i , the aggregate




























Adding S21 to complete the coalition S, we get the aggregate of commodities consumed













which is that same as the aggregate of endowments of members of S. This completes
the proof of effectiveness of the coalition S.
Combining Steps 1-3, we conclude that the coalition S blocks x2RL+1 in the renego-
tiation economy ERL+1(x)
⊕
ERL(e), which establishes the contradiction to x being to
the core of any (m+ n)-re-negotiation economy, for all m ≥ 1 and n ≥ 0.
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